

Senate State, Veterans, & Military Affairs

03/26/2026 Upon Adjournment

SB26-119 Authorize Local Electronic Ballot Return

Typed Text of Testimony Submitted

Name, Position, Representing	Typed Text of Testimony
Rob Bingham For themselves	<p>I served 20 years in the United States Army and retired as a Captain and a helicopter pilot/Commander. During that time I experienced multiple deployments overseas. While deployed, voting was never guaranteed.</p> <p>Ballots were requested weeks in advance, but delivery was inconsistent. Sometimes they arrived late. Sometimes they didn't arrive at all. Even when they did, returning them was another challenge. Mail timelines were uncertain, and there was always a question of whether my vote would actually be counted.</p> <p>There's a unique frustration in serving your country while feeling like you might not be able to fully participate in it.</p> <p>This proposal addresses a real gap. It's not about convenience, it's about access. For deployed service members, overseas citizens, and others in similar situations, electronic ballot return could mean the difference between participating and being left out entirely.</p> <p>I support efforts that ensure eligible voters can reliably cast their ballot, regardless of where they are serving or living.</p>
Aubrey Wilde For	Colorado Coalition for the Homeless (the Coalition) is in strong support of SB26-119 Authorize Local Electronic Ballot Return.

<p>Colorado Coalition for the Homeless</p>	<p>For over 40 years, the Coalition has worked collaboratively toward the prevention of homelessness and the creation of lasting solutions for families, children, and individuals who are experiencing or at-risk of homelessness throughout Colorado. The Coalition advocates for and provides a continuum of housing and services to improve health, well-being, and stability for 20,000 people each year.</p> <p>The Coalition also does extensive voter outreach, and we see firsthand how barriers to basic civic participation intersect with barriers to housing, health care, and economic opportunity. Voting is one of the most important ways for people to advocate for their needs and shape the policies that affect their lives. Yet too many unhoused Coloradans are effectively excluded from this fundamental right.</p> <p>Mobile voting, offered as an additional and voluntary option, has the potential to meaningfully expand access while preserving election integrity. When implemented with strong security, transparency, and verification safeguards, it can provide a safe and reliable way for people who face housing instability to participate in local elections.</p> <p>Colorado has already seen the promise of this approach. In 2019, Denver conducted a mobile voting pilot program for military and overseas voters that doubled participation among that group. This demonstrated that secure mobile voting can increase engagement among populations that face logistical and structural barriers.</p> <p>Allowing statutory towns and special districts to opt into mobile voting respects local control while encouraging thoughtful innovation. It empowers communities to choose tools that reflect the realities of their residents and strengthens democracy at the local level.</p>
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	<p>For people experiencing homelessness, voting is a way to influence decisions about housing, public services, transportation, health care, and community investment. Ensuring access to the ballot helps ensure that these voices are not left out of the conversation.</p> <p>The Coalition respectfully urges you to support SB26-119 to expand local options for mobile voting and helps make Colorado’s elections more inclusive, equitable, and responsive to all residents.</p>
<p>Ingrid Moore</p> <p>For themselves</p>	<p>I respectfully ask for a YES vote on this bill.</p> <p>This important bill to allow voters to cast and return ballots electronically is a much-needed hedge against adverse federal actions and court rulings that may impact returning ballots through the mail. We know this is already done for military and ex-pat voters through qualified secure transmission systems.</p> <p>This process will not create additional administrative burden and potential for human error in the transcription process.</p> <p>Election workers are already doing this process for overseas ballots received electronically.</p> <p>As an election judge, I have worked on teams that do the process of transcribing electronic ballots into paper ballots that can be scanned like all the rest.</p> <p>The teams are bi-partisan. The team members also visually and verbally verify each entry to each other, double-checking every data point. This eliminates, I would posit, pretty much all human error.</p> <p>I respectfully ask for a YES vote on this bill.</p>
<p>Steve Schleiker</p> <p>Against</p>	<p>Chair and Members of the Committee,</p>

<p>El Paso County Clerk and Recorder's Office</p>	<p>Thank you for the opportunity to submit written testimony on Senate Bill 26-119. I respectfully oppose this legislation.</p> <p>While SB 26-119 is intended to apply to municipalities and special districts not coordinated elections administered by county clerks it will still have significant operational, financial, and public confidence impacts on county election offices.</p> <p>Operationally, the bill introduces a new method of ballot return that will create confusion for voters. Most voters do not distinguish between elections conducted by municipalities, special districts, or the county. As a result, county offices will see increased inquiries about why electronic ballot return is available in some elections but not others, placing additional strain on staff during high-demand periods.</p> <p>Although implementation is assigned to local election officials, county clerks will likely become the default resource for guidance and troubleshooting. Smaller jurisdictions often rely on county expertise, and this bill allows for different systems across jurisdictions within the same county. This fragmentation undermines consistency and complicates voter education.</p> <p>There are also public confidence concerns. If issues arise in a local election using electronic ballot return, the public will look to the county clerk for answers, regardless of our role. This creates reputational risk and could erode trust in elections.</p> <p>Finally, while the fiscal note addresses costs for adopting jurisdictions, it does not account for indirect, unfunded impacts on county offices. Increased workload, communication demands, and coordination will strain existing resources.</p>
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	<p>SB 26-119 risks creating a patchwork of election practices within a single county, which runs counter to the consistency and clarity voters expect.</p> <p>For these reasons, I respectfully urge a “no” vote.</p> <p>Thank you for your consideration.</p>
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Civics Unplugged
TESTIMONY IN SUPPORT OF SB26-119
Senate State, Veterans, & Military Affairs Committee
Thursday, March 26, 2026 • ~11:00 AM • Old Supreme Court

Re: Support for SB26-119 – Mobile Voting Opt-In Legislation

Dear Members of the Legislature,

On behalf of Civics Unplugged, we write in strong support of legislation that would allow towns and special districts to opt in to offering secure mobile voting in their local elections.

Civics Unplugged is a national nonprofit that helps young innovators confront systemic challenges head-on, generating a continuous abundance of innovative and impactful solutions for our communities and our democracy. We work with student fellows and alumni in every state across the country who are deeply committed to strengthening civic life and expanding participation in the democratic process.

Through our work, we consistently hear from young people who care deeply about their communities but struggle to engage with traditional voting systems. Young voters often face significant barriers, including limited transportation, demanding school and work schedules, caregiving responsibilities, and frequent moves for education or employment. These challenges make it harder for many young people to participate consistently in local elections.

At the same time, young voters are digital natives who manage their education, finances, healthcare, and communication through technology. It is increasingly difficult for them to understand why voting—one of the most important civic responsibilities—has not kept pace with the tools they use every day.

That is why accessible, secure voting options that responsibly use new technology are so important. When implemented with strong safeguards, mobile voting can expand access while maintaining transparency and trust. Offered as an additional option alongside existing methods, it can help ensure that more young people are able to participate in shaping their communities.

The Mobile Voting Project has been a strong partner in this work because it meets young voters where they are—on their phones. By combining modern technology with rigorous security standards, mobile voting platforms demonstrate that innovation and election integrity can coexist.

Legislation that allows municipalities to opt in to mobile voting respects local control while encouraging thoughtful experimentation. It gives communities the flexibility to explore new ways to engage residents and build lifelong civic habits among young voters.

By supporting this legislation, you affirm that democracy must evolve to remain inclusive, relevant, and representative of all generations. You help ensure that young people are not only heard during major national elections, but also empowered to participate in the local decisions that affect their daily lives.

We respectfully urge you to support this effort and to continue advancing policies that strengthen participation, equity, and innovation in our democratic systems.

Thank you for your leadership and your commitment to the future of our democracy.

Sincerely,

Joshua Thompson

CEO and Co-founder
Civics Unplugged

**Testimony of Susan Greenhalgh
Senior Advisor on Election Security
Free Speech For People
Submitted to the
Colorado Senate Committee on State, Veterans & Military Affairs
Contact: susan@freespeechforpeople.org**

Re: SB26-119- AGAINST

March 26, 2026

Thank you Chair Wallace, Vice Chair Sullivan, and members of the Committee for the opportunity to offer testimony on SB26-119.

I serve as the senior advisor on election security for Free Speech For People, a national, non-profit non-partisan legal advocacy organization dedicated to defending our democracy and our Constitution. I have studied electronic ballot return for twenty years and have authored several reports on it, with partners including the American Association for the Advancement of Science¹ and the Association of Computing Machinists.² Free Speech For People is committed to preserving and enhancing access to the ballot for all voters, and to protecting the security and integrity of all ballots cast to ensure our elections represent the will of the voters.

We recognize and agree with the intent of SB26-119 and support efforts to increase voter participation. *But we vigorously oppose the electronic return of voted ballots because ballots transmitted electronically, by email, fax and online ballot portal, are all at high risk for privacy risks, manipulation, and fraud.* At a time when election confidence is under attack, expanding dangerously insecure electronic ballot return will degrade not just the security of Colorado's elections, but also confidence in elections and trust in government.

It is well-researched, settled science that returning ballots electronically over the internet is dangerously and unacceptably insecure. This has been established by the Department of Homeland Security, the National Institute of Standards and

¹ Greenhalgh, S., Newell, S., "Leveraging Electronic Ballot Return Safely and Securely During the COVID-19 Pandemic," *American Association for the Advancement of Science*, (Jun 2020). <https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/Leveraging%20Electronic%20Balloting%20Options%20Safely%20and%20Securely%20During%20the%20COVID-19%20Pandemic.pdf>

² Greenhalgh, S., et al, "Email and Internet Voting: The Overlooked Threat to Election Security," *ACM U.S. Technology Policy Committee*, (Oct. 18, 2018). <https://www.acm.org/binaries/content/assets/public-policy/jtreportemailinternetvoting.pdf>

Technology, the FBI, and U.S. Election Assistance Commission, as well as the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine, and countless public and private studies. Despite the promises of vendors and proponents of online ballot return, there is no question that it is dangerously and unacceptably insecure.

Existing security controls do not mitigate the security risks inherent with mobile voting.

The security controls included in SB26-119, such as printing paper ballots after transmission or requiring encryption, do not eliminate the high risk of mobile voting. These are provisions that vendors and proponents of online voting promote to obfuscate the insoluble security risks inherent with electronic ballot return.

Cyber-attacks cannot be effectively mitigated if an electronic ballot is printed on paper after it is received at the election office and the tabulation is conducted offline. Any cyber-attack, or manipulation of electronically transmitted ballots, can occur *after* the voter reviews the ballot, and *before* the ballot reaches the election office for printing. This means the printed ballot would reflect the corrupted votes chosen by the attacker, not the voter.

Moreover, even with so-called “end-to-end” encryption, ballots voted on a mobile application are vulnerable to undetectable and invisible manipulation by malware before the ballot is encrypted on the voter’s device, and/or after it’s decrypted at the election office. Encryption’s security benefits are limited and cannot protect ballots created on a mobile application from malware on the mobile device.

Quite plainly, ballots returned online cannot be made secure. In 2020 and again in 2024, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the U.S. Election Assistance Commission published a [risk-assessment](#)³ which "*recommends paper ballot return, as electronic ballot return technologies are high risk even with controls in place.*"⁴ [Emphasis added.] In other words, from 2020 to 2024, the Department of Homeland Security recommended states should continue to use paper ballots because there are serious and significant security risks introduced with the electronic transmission of marked ballots that cannot be adequately mitigated with any of the security tools and controls available, and ballots returned online are at high risk of tampering or manipulation.

³ Available at: <https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000172-9406-dd0c-ab73-fe6e10070001>

⁴ *Ibid.*

DHS’s blunt warning against the use of online voting echoed bipartisan recommendations from the [U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence](#), [published](#) in response to findings that foreign governments were actively trying to attack U.S. election systems. The Committee explicitly wrote: “States should resist pushes for online voting.”⁵

In 2018, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine (NASEM) released a [report](#) stating that the technology to return marked ballots securely and anonymously over the internet does not exist.⁶ These findings were all further affirmed by a study that was released from the University of California at Berkeley in December 2022.⁷ This study is notable as it was commissioned by Bradley Tusk, a prominent proponent for online voting.

Despite promises from vendors and online voting supporters, many studies have reviewed [specific⁸ internet⁹ voting systems¹⁰](#) and consistently, all have found that despite their claims of innovation and security, these systems have fundamental vulnerabilities that are not remediable.

At a time when election security and public confidence in our elections are under attack, increased electronic return of voted ballots, whether from a phone, tablet, or computer, is simply not safe or secure in any form.

Online voting is not comparable to online banking.

The public may ask, ‘I can bank online, why can’t I vote online?’ But voting involves critical differences that make it a much more difficult enterprise to secure

⁵ Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 1: Russian Efforts Against Election Infrastructure with Additional Views, 2019, Available at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume1.pdf

⁶ National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine, 2018. “Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy.” Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. Available at: <https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25120/securing-the-vote-protecting-american-democracy>

⁷ R. Michael Alvarez et al., University of California, Berkeley Center for Security in Politics, Working Group Statement on Developing Standards for Internet Ballot Return 10 (2022), <https://csp.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Working-Group-Statement-on-Internet-Ballot-Return.pdf>.

⁸ Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2020. “The Ballot is Busted Before the Blockchain: A Security Analysis of Voatz, the First Internet Voting Application Used in U.S. Federal Elections.” https://internetpolicy.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/SecurityAnalysisOfVoatz_Public.pdf

⁹ “Our full report on the Voatz Internet voting system,” Trail of Bits, March 13, 2020. Available at: <https://blog.trailofbits.com/2020/03/13/our-full-report-on-the-voatz-mobile-voting-platform/>

¹⁰ See *supra* note 3.

than online banking or commerce.¹¹ Online transactions are not secret or anonymous; a customer can check her statement to detect and address fraudulent charges. But we vote by secret ballot; there is no mechanism for the voter or election official to check to ensure ballots were not manipulated or hacked in transit and that the votes are legitimate. This makes online elections especially vulnerable to undetected hacking.

The assumption that online banking can be done securely is faulty. It is estimated that banks lose millions or even billions of dollars every year to online attacks.¹² High profile hacks like that on Citibank, JP Morgan Chase, and Bank of America prove that even system with high cyber security budgets (much higher than Colorado's), cannot resist determined attackers.

Use of online voting is not evidence that it is secure.

During the early 2000's, Congress tasked the Department of Defense, through the National Defense Authorization Act, to develop a secure online voting system for military voters. Consequently, many states passed laws to permit electronic ballot return, planning to opt into the system provided by the Department of Defense. A system was developed in 2004 but was never deployed because a security evaluation determined that illegitimate ballots could be cast undetectably. Subsequently, after years of federal research that concluded electronic ballot return could not be made secure,¹³ the Department of Defense and federal government abandoned the effort. Yet many states, adopted laws in the 2000's based on the reasonable assumption that the Department of Defense would soon offer a "secure" online balloting option, which never materialized.

It's also important to also understand that most of these states enacted policies to allow online return of voted ballots when cybercrime was much less commonplace and mature. Cybercrime has advanced significantly in the last decade, and by expert accounts, the expertise and sophistication of today's cyber criminals has far out-paced our defenses. We know much more today than we did then, and today's

¹¹ "If I Can Shop and Bank Online, Why Can't I Vote Online?" by David Jefferson, Computer Scientist, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, member, Verified Voting Foundation Board, Board of Directors, California Voter Foundation
<https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/internet-voting/vote-online/>

¹² <https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-identity-theft-and-cybercrime>

¹³ <https://www.nist.gov/itl/voting/uocava-voting>

policy decisions should be based on the research conducted and the current threat model.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide this testimony.

Respectfully submitted,

Susan Greenhalgh

Senior Advisor on Election Security

Free Speech For People.

Support SB26-119

Dear Members of the Colorado Legislature:

My name is Joseph Kiniry. I am the co-founder and CEO of Free & Fair, a public benefit corporation dedicated to building trustworthy elections technology. I'm writing to share my perspective on VoteSecure, a project we have been building with funding from Tusk Philanthropies, and to explain what it could mean for the future of secure remote voting in your jurisdiction.

I understand that remote voting is a topic where opinions run strong. Some believe it should never be attempted, while others see it as essential to expanding voter access. Rather than asking you to take my word for it, I want to lay out what we have built, the standards it meets, and let you evaluate the evidence on its own merits.

Our company name reflects our mission: we build elections technology that is free of cost to use and designed to make elections fairer. We hold ourselves to the highest ethical standards because the integrity of democratic elections demands nothing less.

Our track record includes work that you or your colleagues may already rely on. We built CORLA, the original software used to conduct statewide Risk-Limiting Audits in Colorado—the kind of post-election audit that gives the public confidence that results are correct. We also helped Microsoft develop ElectionGuard, a widely recognized tool for election security. VoteSecure is our newest and most ambitious project, and it is the subject of this letter.

In plain terms, VoteSecure is a set of security blueprints and ready-to-use software tools that would allow a voting system vendor to build a remote voting system where every vote is protected and independently verifiable. Let me explain what that means and why it matters.

Think of VoteSecure as two things. First, it is a detailed security rulebook—a precise set of instructions for how a voter's device, the election server, and independent auditors must communicate to keep every ballot secret and tamper-proof. This is what technologists call a "protocol," and it uses the same kind of advanced security (called cryptography) that protects your online banking, medical records, and government communications every day.

Second, VoteSecure is a ready-to-use software toolkit that technology vendors can incorporate into their voting platforms. We released the first version in November 2025, and it is freely available and open-source—meaning anyone can inspect and audit it.

The key feature of VoteSecure is that it provides what experts call "end-to-end verifiability." Here is what that means in practical terms: a voter can confirm that their individual ballot was recorded correctly, and anyone—voters, election officials, independent observers, or the general public—can verify that all the ballots were counted accurately, without ever revealing how any individual person voted. It is like a tamper-evident seal on every step of the process, from the moment a voter marks their choices to the final published results.

This kind of verifiability does not exist in most voting systems used today, whether in-person or remote. VoteSecure was specifically designed to allow voters to participate from any

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location—using a smartphone, tablet, or computer—while maintaining security protections that meet or exceed what the Department of Defense requires for national security systems.

How confident should you be in this technology? Software quality is typically graded on international scales, similar to how building codes rate structural safety. Most security software used around the world today would receive a C grade at best. The software built by the most security-conscious organizations in the world—companies like Amazon, Google, and Apple, often using tools that my teams helped create in my role as a Principal Scientist at Galois, a leading security research firm—achieves a B to A+ grade. VoteSecure is built to that same top tier: an A grade on internationally recognized quality standards.

Beyond the software itself, VoteSecure comes with something that no other system like it provides: an extensive package of documentation, security analyses, and evidence of correctness that goes far beyond industry norms. This means that when your staff, your auditors, or independent experts examine VoteSecure, they will find detailed explanations of every design decision, every security guarantee, and the evidence backing each claim.

Our software is written in a programming language specifically endorsed by the U.S. Department of Defense for building safe, secure systems. And because VoteSecure is open-source and freely available, we expect other teams and companies to build upon it and create their own implementations over time—just as the security technology protecting your web browser today has been independently implemented by dozens of different organizations worldwide.

I want to be transparent about what VoteSecure is and is not. It is the secure foundation—the engine and the safety systems—but it is not a finished car. A voting system vendor still needs to build the user interface, the ballot design, the administrative tools, and integrate VoteSecure into a complete product that meets your state's or jurisdiction's specific requirements. Vendors like our partner Sequent are doing exactly this kind of integration work.

There is still important work ahead. We want to expand VoteSecure to support every ballot type and election format used across the United States and beyond. We want to complete additional layers of mathematical verification—the equivalent of having an independent accounting firm audit every line of a financial statement. And we want to provide you, as elections officials, with rigorous, evidence-based risk analyses so you can make informed decisions about if and when remote voting is appropriate for your jurisdiction.

Despite the work remaining, we have built an excellent foundation on which voting system vendors can begin to build real, working remote voting systems that meet the highest security standards in the world.

I encourage you to explore VoteSecure for yourself. The project and all of its documentation are publicly available. If you or your technical advisors would like to evaluate it, ask questions, or discuss how it might apply to your jurisdiction's needs, we welcome that conversation. Our goal is not to push any jurisdiction into adopting remote voting before it is ready, but to ensure that when that decision is made, the technology behind it is the most trustworthy available.

While there is active discussion and healthy scrutiny of VoteSecure—as there should be for any system that touches democratic elections—I am extremely proud of what we have built. This is

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the most rigorously developed and documented election security toolkit in the world, and it represents a significant first step toward a future where remote voting can be offered with genuine, verifiable confidence in its integrity.

We look forward to working with voting system vendors, elections officials, and policy makers who want to explore what VoteSecure can do. The security of our democratic process deserves nothing less than the best technology we can build, and I believe VoteSecure is exactly that.



Dr. Joseph Kiniry, PhD
Principled CEO and Chief Scientist, Free & Fair
Principal Scientist, Galois
CEO and Chief Scientist, Sigil Logic



To: Colorado Senate State, Veterans & Military Affairs Committee
Colorado State Capitol
Denver, Colorado 80203

March 24, 2025

From: Dr. Shawn P. Murray
Murray Security Services

Re: Letter of Support — Senate Bill 26-119

Dear Chair and Members of the Committee,

My name is Dr. Shawn P. Murray. I am President and Chief Academic Officer of Murray Security Services, a Colorado Springs-based cybersecurity consulting and training firm. I am a Distinguished Fellow and Past President of the International Board of Directors for the Information Systems Security Association (ISSA), and I was appointed Honorary Commander to the U.S. Space Force in 2023. I have spent over two decades working cybersecurity missions alongside the U.S. Army, Air Force, Missile Defense Agency, NSA, and the U.S. Defense and State Departments.

I will be direct: I understand the skepticism around internet-based voting. Legacy systems — email, fax, web portals — carry real risk, and that concern is legitimate. But Senate Bill 26-119 is not that. The protocol authorized by this bill uses end-to-end verifiable cryptography — the same discipline that secures military communications, protects classified systems, and underpins the most trusted infrastructure in the world. When security is done right, it works. It is verifiable, it is auditable, and any attempt to tamper with it produces evidence rather than silence. That is exactly what this system is designed to do.

The people this bill serves are the same people I have worked alongside my entire career — service members deployed overseas, veterans in remote communities, military families navigating constant moves and changing duty stations. These voters already face barriers that most Coloradans never will. They deserve a secure, verified path to participate in elections — not a workaround, and not a compromise. This bill provides that.

It is also worth noting that Colorado already permits ballot return by email and fax — with no cryptographic protections whatsoever. SB26-119 does not lower the bar. It raises it. And because this bill is entirely opt-in, no jurisdiction is required to adopt it.

This is measured, responsible policy that gives communities a better tool if they choose to use it. I respectfully urge this Committee to support Senate Bill 26-119. I welcome any technical questions and am available before or during the hearing to discuss this further.

Respectfully submitted,

Dr. Shawn P. Murray, C|CISO, CISSP, CRISC
President & CAO, Murray Security Services
Colorado Springs, Colorado
Distinguished Fellow & Past President, ISSA International Board of Directors

Senate State, Veterans, & Military Affairs

03/26/2026

SB26-119 Authorize Local Electronic Ballot Return

Typed Text of Testimony Submitted

Name, Position, Representing	Typed Text of Testimony
<p>Aubrey Wilde For Colorado Coalition for the Homeless</p>	<p>Colorado Coalition for the Homeless (the Coalition) is in strong support of SB26-119 Authorize Local Electronic Ballot Return.</p> <p>For over 40 years, the Coalition has worked collaboratively toward the prevention of homelessness and the creation of lasting solutions for families, children, and individuals who are experiencing or at-risk of homelessness throughout Colorado. The Coalition advocates for and provides a continuum of housing and services to improve health, well-being, and stability for 20,000 people each year.</p> <p>The Coalition also does extensive voter outreach, and we see firsthand how barriers to basic civic participation intersect with barriers to housing, health care, and economic opportunity. Voting is one of the most important ways for people to advocate for their needs and shape the policies that affect their lives. Yet too many unhoused Coloradans are effectively excluded from this fundamental right.</p> <p>Mobile voting, offered as an additional and voluntary option, has the potential to meaningfully expand access while preserving election integrity. When implemented with strong security, transparency, and verification safeguards, it can provide a safe and reliable way for people who face housing instability to participate in local elections.</p> <p>Colorado has already seen the promise of this approach. In 2019, Denver conducted a mobile voting pilot program for military and overseas voters that doubled participation among that group. This demonstrated that secure mobile voting can increase engagement among populations that face logistical and structural barriers.</p> <p>Allowing statutory towns and special districts to opt into mobile voting respects local control while encouraging thoughtful innovation. It</p>

	<p>empowers communities to choose tools that reflect the realities of their residents and strengthens democracy at the local level.</p> <p>For people experiencing homelessness, voting is a way to influence decisions about housing, public services, transportation, health care, and community investment. Ensuring access to the ballot helps ensure that these voices are not left out of the conversation.</p> <p>The Coalition respectfully urges you to support SB26-119 to expand local options for mobile voting and helps make Colorado’s elections more inclusive, equitable, and responsive to all residents.</p>
<p>Ingrid Moore</p> <p>For themselves</p>	<p>I respectfully ask for a YES vote on this bill.</p> <p>This important bill to allow voters to cast and return ballots electronically is a much-needed hedge against adverse federal actions and court rulings that may impact returning ballots through the mail. We know this is already done for military and ex-pat voters through qualified secure transmission systems.</p> <p>This process will not create additional administrative burden and potential for human error in the transcription process.</p> <p>Election workers are already doing this process for overseas ballots received electronically.</p> <p>As an election judge, I have worked on teams that do the process of transcribing electronic ballots into paper ballots that can be scanned like all the rest.</p> <p>The teams are bi-partisan. The team members also visually and verbally verify each entry to each other, double-checking every data point. This eliminates, I would posit, pretty much all human error.</p> <p>I respectfully ask for a YES vote on this bill.</p>
<p>Rob Bingham</p> <p>For themselves</p>	<p>I served 20 years in the United States Army and retired as a Captain and a helicopter pilot/Commander. During that time I experienced multiple deployments overseas. While deployed, voting was never guaranteed.</p> <p>Ballots were requested weeks in advance, but delivery was inconsistent. Sometimes they arrived late. Sometimes they didn’t</p>

	<p>arrive at all. Even when they did, returning them was another challenge. Mail timelines were uncertain, and there was always a question of whether my vote would actually be counted.</p> <p>Thereâ€™s a unique frustration in serving your country while feeling like you might not be able to fully participate in it.</p> <p>This proposal addresses a real gap. Itâ€™s not about convenience, itâ€™s about access. For deployed service members, overseas citizens, and others in similar situations, electronic ballot return could mean the difference between participating and being left out entirely.</p> <p>I support efforts that ensure eligible voters can reliably cast their ballot, regardless of where they are serving or living.</p>
<p>Steve Schleiker Against El Paso County Clerk and Recorder's Office</p>	<p>Chair and Members of the Committee,</p> <p>Thank you for the opportunity to submit written testimony on Senate Bill 26-119. I respectfully oppose this legislation.</p> <p>While SB 26-119 is intended to apply to municipalities and special districtsâ€”not coordinated elections administered by county clerksâ€”it will still have significant operational, financial, and public confidence impacts on county election offices.</p> <p>Operationally, the bill introduces a new method of ballot return that will create confusion for voters. Most voters do not distinguish between elections conducted by municipalities, special districts, or the county. As a result, county offices will see increased inquiries about why electronic ballot return is available in some elections but not others, placing additional strain on staff during high-demand periods.</p> <p>Although implementation is assigned to local election officials, county clerks will likely become the default resource for guidance and troubleshooting. Smaller jurisdictions often rely on county expertise, and this bill allows for different systems across jurisdictions within the same county. This fragmentation undermines consistency and complicates voter education.</p>

	<p>There are also public confidence concerns. If issues arise in a local election using electronic ballot return, the public will look to the county clerk for answers, regardless of our role. This creates reputational risk and could erode trust in elections.</p> <p>Finally, while the fiscal note addresses costs for adopting jurisdictions, it does not account for indirect, unfunded impacts on county offices. Increased workload, communication demands, and coordination will strain existing resources.</p> <p>SB 26-119 risks creating a patchwork of election practices within a single county, which runs counter to the consistency and clarity voters expect.</p> <p>For these reasons, I respectfully urge a "no" vote.</p> <p>Thank you for your consideration.</p>
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Wade J. Henderson

Civil and Human Rights

TESTIMONY IN SUPPORT OF SB26-119

Senate State, Veterans, & Military Affairs Committee

Thursday, March 26, 2026 • ~11:00 AM • Old Supreme Court

March 26, 2026

I write in strong support of SB26-119 legislation that would allow jurisdictions to adopt secure mobile voting as an optional method in local elections.

Throughout my career in the civil rights movement—including serving as the longtime president and CEO of The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights—I have worked to protect and expand the fundamental right to vote. History teaches us that access to the ballot is never guaranteed; it must be defended and strengthened as our society changes. Barriers to participation do not always appear as explicit prohibitions. More often, they emerge through systems that fail to keep pace with the realities of people’s lives.

Mobile voting presents an opportunity to confront those modern barriers. Too many eligible voters—particularly people of color, people with disabilities, seniors, young voters, military families, and working Americans—face obstacles such as transportation challenges, inflexible work schedules, mobility limitations, or distance from polling locations. When these barriers persist, communities are effectively excluded from decisions that shape their schools, neighborhoods, and economic futures.

Civil rights has always been about ensuring both the right to vote and the practical ability to exercise that right. Secure mobile voting, offered as an additional option alongside existing methods, aligns with that principle. When built with transparency, end-to-end verification, and strong security safeguards, mobile voting can expand participation without compromising election integrity.

The civil rights movement has long embraced innovation when it advances justice—from expanding voter registration tools to enforcing language access and disability accommodations. Mobile voting continues that tradition by meeting voters where they are and recognizing that democracy must evolve to remain inclusive.

Legislation that enables jurisdictions to opt in to mobile voting reflects a commitment to equity, local empowerment, and the promise of a more representative democracy. I urge you to support

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Wade J. Henderson

Civil and Human Rights

this effort and take a meaningful step toward ensuring that our democratic systems work for all people—not just those with the fewest barriers to participation.

Thank you for your leadership and your continued commitment to civil and human rights.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Wade Henderson", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Wade Henderson
Former President & CEO
The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights

2325 First St NW
Washington, DC 20001

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DARRELL B. WATSON

DENVER CITY COUNCIL MEMBER, DISTRICT 9

March 20, 2026

To: **The Honorable Members of the Senate State, Veterans, & Military Affairs Committee**
Colorado General Assembly, Colorado State Capitol, Denver, Colorado 80203

Re: **Letter of Support for Senate Bill 26-119, "Authorize Local Electronic Ballot Return"**

Dear Chair, Vice Chair, and Honorable Members of the Committee

I write in strong support of Senate Bill 26-119. I serve on the Denver City Council representing District 9. I also live in a city that has seen how electronic ballot return can expand access and protect every voter's voice. I urge the Committee to advance this bill and give Colorado's statutory towns and special districts the same tools that many voters in our state already rely on.

Denver has direct experience with this technology. In 2019, the Denver Elections Division partnered with the National Cybersecurity Center and Tusk Philanthropies to pilot mobile voting for military and overseas voters. The results were clear. Turnout among UOCAVA voters more than doubled compared to the previous municipal election. Every voter who used the system reported that voting on a smartphone was easier than any other method they had used. Independent volunteer auditors reviewed the system and confirmed full accuracy in counting and recording every ballot. The National Association of Election Officials later honored this work with the Democracy Award. Colorado has become a national leader in removing barriers for voters who face the greatest challenges. Universal mail ballots, secure drop boxes, electronic delivery of blank ballots to UOCAVA voters, and accessible voting systems all support this goal. These investments matter. They help deployed service members, overseas civilians, voters with disabilities, and people displaced by disasters stay connected to their democracy.

Yet these protections do not reach the thousands of statutory towns and special districts that govern essential local services. These governments manage water, sewer, fire protection, parks, libraries, roads, and land use for millions of residents. Their elections may occur in April or May and may not use mail ballots. A service member who owns property in one of these districts may have no reliable way to vote in elections that shape their taxes and the services their family depends on. Senate Bill 26-119 closes this gap. The bill does not require any jurisdiction to offer electronic ballot return. It does not replace mail ballots or polling places. It simply gives local governments the choice to offer an additional option if they decide it fits their community.

Denver showed that electronic ballot return can be secure, accurate, and accessible. Senate Bill 26-119 gives other communities the chance to offer the same support to their voters. I respectfully ask the Committee to advance the bill and give local governments the tools they need to serve every voter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Darrell B. Watson".

Darrell B. Watson

Denver City Council Member, District 9 | (720) 337-7709 | District9@DenverGov.org
2855 Tremont Place, Suite 201, Denver, CO 80205

To: Senate State, Veterans, & Military Affairs Committee

From: Tony Haas | Veterans for All Voters

Date: March 26, 2026

RE: Written Testimony in Support of SB26-119 (Authorize Local Electronic Ballot Return)



Chair and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify in strong support of **SB26-119**. While Colorado is frequently celebrated as the "gold standard" for election administration, overlooked gaps in our robust democratic infrastructure remain. SB26-119 directly and effectively addresses one of these gaps by providing local jurisdictions, including statutory towns, cities, and special districts, the same modern tools that have already proven effective at the state and county levels.

Every year, millions of Coloradans are governed by the decisions of over 3,600 special districts and hundreds of municipalities. These bodies manage our water, fire protection, public safety, and essential services. Yet, because these elections often occur outside the coordinated county mail-ballot system, they frequently see very low turnout.

This isn't due entirely to a lack of civic interest, but is in large part a result of systemic inaccessibility. When a local election relies on traditional polling places or proactive absentee requests, it becomes inherently more difficult for many voters to participate. Among those groups affected by this are overseas and military voters.

For a service member deployed abroad, the turnaround time for international mail can sometimes exceed the entire duration of a local election cycle. Under current law, those who defend our democracy are frequently unable to participate in it at the local level. SB 26-119 corrects this and fully enfranchises our overseas service members, allowing them to fully participate in their local elections.

It is important to emphasize that SB 26-119 is an opt-in measure. This bill does not mandate a "one-size-fits-all" requirement. It acknowledges that Colorado's diverse jurisdictions have different administrative capacities, and simply gives local officials the *choice* to modernize if they have the resources and the need to do so.

All Colorado voters, including those Coloradans working or serving overseas, should have full access to participate in the democratic process at all levels of government. SB26-119 is a common-sense extension of democratic access that ensures every Coloradan has a voice in the governments closest to them. I urge the Committee to move this bill forward with a favorable recommendation.