Cases of Note
Courts presume that the General Assembly is aware of court decisions that construe state statutes or the constitution. The OLLS will update this web page quarterly to notify the General Assembly of such court decisions. Cases that may be of particular interest because they meet certain criteria have been summarized and are listed below in chronological order. Summaries for cases older than a year are available in an archive.
No on EE v. Beall, Colorado Court of Appeals No. 22CA2245 (August 1, 2024)
Holding: The requirement in section 1-45-108.3, C.R.S., that an issue committee disclose the identity of the registered agent of the entity paying for the communication on certain election-related communications distributed to the voting public is unconstitutional and violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Case Summary: An issue committee, No on EE, was fined for failing to disclose certain information on election-related communications in violation of section 1-45-108.3, C.R.S., of the Fair Campaign Practices Act. As relevant to the case, section 1-45-108.3 requires an issue committee to disclose, on any covered communication supporting or opposing a ballot issue or ballot question that is distributed to the voting public, the name of the person paying for the communication and the name of the natural person who is the registered agent of the entity paying for the communication, if that entity is not a natural person. No on EE appealed from the order affirming the fine against it for failing to disclose the registered agent on multiple communications during the 2020 election cycle. No on EE argued that the registered agent disclosure requirement was facially unconstitutional and violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
A disclosure requirement on election-related communications withstands a First Amendment challenge only if it survives "exacting scrutiny" and is narrowly tailored to the government's asserted interest in requiring the disclosure, which must be sufficiently important. The Court of Appeals determined that the registered agent disclosure requirement was not sufficiently related to a sufficiently important governmental interest, including the asserted interest of providing information to the voting public about the issue committee's sources of funding or its "legal face". A division of the Court of Appeals therefore concluded that the registered agent disclosure requirement in section 1-45-108.3, C.R.S., did not withstand the exacting scrutiny of a First Amendment challenge and was unconstitutional on its face. (For more information, contact Rebecca Bayetti.)
Castro v. People, Colorado Supreme Court No. 22SC712 (July 1, 2024)
Holding: The court holds that an alternate juror may be substituted mid-deliberation.
Case Summary: During jury deliberations, a juror suffered a heart attack. An alternate juror was added, and the new jury convicted the defendant. The defendant appealed, alleging that the substitution of an alternate juror after deliberations had begun required a mistrial. The Supreme Court held that substitution of a regular juror with an alternate juror during deliberations raises a presumption of prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial, but that here the presumption was overcome. The Court noted, as it had previously, that the General Assembly should look at clarifying the statutes. (For more information, contact Jessica Chapman.)
People v. Vega Dominguez, Colorado Court of Appeals No. 21CA1144 (April 4, 2024)
Holding: When the identical conduct results in convictions under two distinct crimes having different penalties, equal protection requires that the conviction of the crime with the more severe penalty must be vacated.
Case Summary: In this case, the defendant was convicted of both attempted patronizing a prostituted child and attempted inducement of child prostitution. The court found that the identical conduct formed the basis for both convictions. While both attempted patronizing a prostituted child and attempted inducement of child prostitution are class 4 felonies, attempted patronizing a prostituted child qualifies as a sex offense that is punishable by "indeterminate" sentencing that can mean a life sentence whereas attempted inducement of child prostitution is punishable by only four years in prison. Since the prosecution focused on the meaning of "prostitution by a child," which is language contained in the statutory definitions of both patronizing a prostituted child and inducement of child prostitution, the court of appeals found the lower court to have violated the defendant's right to equal protection under the law and vacated the attempted patronizing a prostituted child offense. (For more information, contact Jessica Chapman.)
Wolven v. del Rosario Velez, Colorado Court of Appeals No. 22CA2120 (January 18, 2024)
Holding: A health-care provider lien agreement is excludable from discovery and at trial pursuant to section 38-27.5-103 (2), C.R.S., if the agreement meets the requirements of sections 38-27.5-104 (1) and 38-27.5-105 (4), C.R.S., at the time the lien agreement is created.
Case Summary: In this personal injury case arising from a vehicular accident, the trial court excluded evidence of the plaintiff's health-care provider lien agreement from trial pursuant to section 38-27.5-103 (2), C.R.S., over argument from the defendant that the lien did not meet the statutory requirements because it was amended to comply with the statute only five days before trial. The court of appeals held that a health-care provider lien agreement is excludable from discovery and at trial pursuant to section 38-27.5-103 (2), C.R.S., if the agreement meets the requirements of sections 38-27.5-104 (1) and 38-27.5-105 (4), C.R.S., at the time the lien agreement is created. Because the amended lien agreement replaced the original lien agreement and the amended lien agreement met the statutory requirements at the time it was created, the trial court did not err in excluding the lien agreement at issue in this case. After finding that the trial court properly excluded the amended lien agreement, the court of appeals remarked:
"We, however, share the trial court’s concerns surrounding the last-minute amendment of the QSN lien agreement ahead of trial. Because section 38-27.5-104 (1) and -105 (4) compliant health-care provider liens are required to be excluded from trial and discovery per section 38-27.5-103 (2), such last-minute changes could lead to gamesmanship. In affirming the trial court’s decision to exclude evidence of the amended QSN lien at trial, as required by statute, we in no way endorse plaintiffs changing lien agreements to comply with section 38-27.5-104 (1) on the eve of trial. However, only the legislature may provide more specific timing rules to determine whether a health-care provider lien that has been amended to conform with section 38-27.5-104(1) is admissible at trial."
(For more information, contact Rebecca Bayetti.)
Bd. of Educ. v. Adams County Sch. Dist., Colorado Supreme Court No. 23SC61 (October 16, 2023)
Holding: The political subdivision doctrine, also known as the rule of Martin, is abandoned, and the Wimberly test is now the sole test for determining whether a party has standing.
Case Summary: Adams 14, a school district whose accreditation was removed by the state board after receiving a priority improvement plan rating, sued the state board to stop the removal of accreditation alleging violations of procedural due process and of the administrative procedures act. Adams 14 appealed the district court's granting the state board's motion to dismiss based on lack of standing under the political subdivision doctrine. The political subdivision doctrine, also known as the rule of Martin, has long precluded subordinate state agencies, political subdivisions, and officials raising claims challenging a superior government entity's decision from having standing unless there were statutory or constitutional provisions expressly authorizing the subordinate party to seek judicial review of the superior government entity's action. Under this doctrine, a school district, such as Adams 14, would lack standing to challenge the state board's actions. The Colorado Supreme Court reexamined the political subdivision doctrine and held that the Wimberly test, in particularly its "legally protected interest" prong, sufficiently addresses the important prudential concerns that the political subdivision doctrine aimed to address and abandoned the doctrine entirely. The court affirmed the district court's order granting the state board's motion to dismiss, albeit on different grounds. (For more information, contact Jessica Herrera.)